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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The Defendant River Ranches agrees with Plaintiff1s
general statement of the issues presented on appeal.
CONTROLLING STATUTE
The controlling statute is found in 35-1-42 Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as amended.

The major portion of that

section is set forth hereafter with the relevant and governing
language being underlined:
35-1-42. The following shall constitute
employers subject to the provisions of this
title;
(1) The state, and each county, city,
town and school district in the state.
(2)
Every person, firm and private corporation, including every public utility,
having in service one of more workmen or
operatives regularly employed in the same
business, or in or about the same establishment, under any contract of hire, express or
implied, oral or written, except agricultural
employers who meet any one of the following
conditions: (a) whose employees are all
members of the immediate family of the
employer, which employer has a proprietary
interest in the farm; provided that the
inclusion of any immediate family member
under the provisions of this title is at the
option of the employer or (b) who employ five
or fewer persons other than immediate family
members for 4 0 hours or more per week per each
employee for 13 consecutive weeks during any
part of the preceding 12 months; and except
domestic employers who do not employ one
employee or more than one employee at least
4 0 hours per week; provided, that employers
of agricultural laborers and domestic servants,
shall have the right to come under the terms
of this title by complying with the provisions
thereof and the rules and regulations of the
commission. . . .

-2STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff

h a s a p p e a l e d a r u l i n g of t h e

Commission a f f i r m i n g

Industrial

t h e o r d e r and a d o p t i n g t h e f i n d i n g s

of

f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of law of t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Law J u d g e .
(R 274)

y
The A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Law J u d g e d e t e r m i n e d t h a t

e m p l o y e r R i v e r R a n c h e s was an " a g r i c u l t u r a l
to §35-1-42(2)(b)

employer"

pursuant

U t a h Code A n n o t a t e d 1 9 5 3 , and t h e r e f o r e

r e q u i r e d t o h a v e Workmen's C o m p e n s a t i o n I n s u r a n c e .
U n d e r d a t e of December 2 0 , 1 9 8 4 , P l a i n t i f f
application

the

f o r h e a r i n g and c l a i m f o r p r o t e c t i o n of

not

(R 2 6 4 - 2 6 5 )
filed

an

rights

a l l e g i n g t h a t h e had b e e n i n j u r e d when t h r o w n from a h o r s e on
April

17, 1984.

-1

Plaintiff's

total

t i m e of employment w i t h

River

R a n c h e s was some t w e n t y - s e v e n d a y s , w h i c h t e r m i n a t e d on A p r i l
1 7 , 1 9 8 4 , t h e d a t e on w h i c h h e s u s t a i n e d t h e i n j u r y
of h e r e i n .

(R 5 5 ; T r .

complained

30)

I t was s t i p u l a t e d t h a t t h e e m p l o y e r i s
Ranches, a l i m i t e d p a r t n e r s h i p ,

River

whose p a r t n e r s a r e

exclusively

—
References t o t h e record paginated pursuant t o Rule 11(b) Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure (URAP) a r e preceeded by t h e l e t t e r "R." The
hearing t r a n s c r i p t i s referenced both with respect t o vdiere i t appears i n
t h e o v e r a l l record and a l s o a s paginated by t h e r e p o r t e r , t h e l a t t e r
being preceeded by t h e l e t t e r s "Tr."
2/
—'
No explanation was given for the Plaintifff s delay in filing the
application, though the record reveals that at the time of his employment
with River Ranches Plaintiff was receiving Workmen's Compensation benefits
fron the State of Wyoming growing out of an injury of March, 1979, which
compensation continued to flew to Plaintiff through November of 1984, the
month preceeding the filing of his application herein. (R 47, 56-57; Tr.
22, 31-32)

-3from the family of Lloyd and Melva Johnson, of Aurora, Utah.
(R 28-31; Tr. 3-6)

The relationship of the partners to each

other is helpful to understanding the employer.

Lloyd and

Melva are the grandfather and grandmother respectively.
3/
There are two sons, Jerold —

and Burke, and five grandsons,

Jerold Jr., Gordon, Dave, Mark and Vince.

The first two

grandsons belong to the son Jerold, and the other three
belong to the son Burke.

The general partners are the grandfather

and his two sons; the limited partners are the grandmother
and the five grandsons.

(Id.)

The grandfather and the two sons are actively
involved in the daily operation and management of the partnership
and receive compensation therefor.
grandfather is the "boss.M

(R 70-71; Tr. 45-46)

(R 66; Tr. 41)

The

The partnership

is engaged in farming, including the raising of crops and
livestock.

(I<d.) There was no evidence that the grandsons

Jerold Jr. or Gordon were directly involved, and the other
three grandsons only worked part time.

Mark and Vince were

full-time students at Utah State University in Logan other
than during the summer months.

(R 72-73; Tr. 47-48)

They

would have resided at home during the times they worked on
the family farm.

(Ixl.) The other grandson Dave lived in a

trailer part of the time and at the farm the other part.
(Id.)
—
The names of Jerold and Jerold Jr. were erroneously spelled "Gerald"
in the reporter's transcript.

-4In his brief filed herein, Plaintiff has unfairly
and inaccurately drawn conclusions and inferences from the
evidence concerning "non-family employees" as well as the
evidence presented in support of River Ranches1 exemption
from the statutory duty of providing Workmen1s Compensation
coverage.

The necessary clarification, though essentially

factual in nature, is treated in the argument portion of the
brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
While Plaintiff argues certain general propositions,
his real claim of error is three-fold.

The claims are (1)

the findings of the Industrial Commission are not supported
by any substantial evidence in the record, (2) River Ranches
failed to produce any evidence to rebut Plaintiff's case, and
(3) a partnership cannot have "immediate family members" and
therefore cannot claim an exemption under the statute.
River Ranches' argument is responsive in nature,
treating Plaintiff's three propositions in the order stated.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE FINDINGS OF THE COMMISSION ARE SUPPORTED BY THE
RECORD.
The standards of review in Industrial Commission

cases is extremely narrow.

This Court will uphold the factual

findings of the Commission if they are supported by "evidence
of any substance whatever which can reasonably be regarded as
supporting the determination made. . . . "

Utah Dept. of

Administrative Services v. Public Service Commission, 6 58
P.2d 601 at 609 (Utah 1983) [quoting Kennecott Copper Corp.

-5Employees v. Dept. of Employment Security, 13 Utah 262, 26465, 372 P.2d 987-989 (1962)], also Davey v. Board of Review,
unpublished opinion in Case No* 20146 filed October 16, 1985.
The only factual determination made by the Commission
had to do with the number of "non-family" employees.

Evidence

on this subject came from three sources: (1) the testimony of
Plaintiff, (2) the testimony of Burke Johnson, general partner,
River Ranches, and (3) the duly admitted records of River
Ranches.

The evidence from all three sources was in accord.
Plaintiff, in response to questions from his

counsel, identified three persons other than himself who
worked for River Ranches.

There were two sheepherders, Mark

Barton and Cameron Conner, and one boy who worked in the shop
named Richard Boyack.

(R 50-51; Tr. 25-26)

He was asked

about Carlyle Bird, a sheepherder, but testified that "I
didn't see him.

He quit when I went to work there, and I

never saw him."

(R. 53; Tr. 28)

(Further, see Plaintiff's

testimony during cross examination R 57-58; Tr. 32-33.)
River Ranches general partner Burke Johnson identified the same parties, to-wit Mark Barton, Cameron Conner and
Richard Boyack.

Plaintiff's brief draws an unfair inference

from Johnson's testimony appearing in the record at R 57-58;
Tr. 42-43.

Beginning with line 22 at R 67, the following

appears:
Q
(By Mr. Dabney) Now would it be a
fair statement to say--I just want to mention
some names—that Mark Barton would fall within
that category? He worked for a period in
excess of that I just read to you?

-6A

I would think so, yes.

Q

Is that correct?

A

Yes.

Q
And Mr. Cameron Conner, he would
also be in that category would be not?
A

I would think he probably could.

Q
And Richard Boyack would be in that
same category?
A

Yes.

Q
And Carlyle Bird would be in that
same category?
A

I would question that.

Q
All right. That one you1re not
sure about. So we have those three that
would meet that qualification?
A

I believe so.

From the foregoing dialogue, Plaintiff asserts in
his brief as follows:
Moreover, he [Burke Johnson] testified that
another employee, Carlyle Bird, might also
satisfy the work requirements of the Act.
(Plaintiff's Brief at 2.)
It is obvious from the text that Mr. Johnson's
affirmative and concluding answer acknowledged only that
there would be "three that would meet [the statutory] qualification."

In fact, Mr. Johnson later gave specific testimony

regarding three persons with the surname "Bird:"

Of Wayne he

said, "I would not think that he fits at all, no" (R 69;
Tr. 44); of Glen he said, "In fact, he would have worked much
less than Wayne Bird" (Icl.) ; and of Carlyle he testified,
"Mr. Carlyle Bird and Mr. Glen Bird worked for us from approximately

-7the 7th day of March, until the time that they quit prior to
Mr. Barton's employment, which would have been . • . approximately the 20th of March.

Somewhere around there.

So

possibly two to three weeks would be the most they could be
considered at that time."

(R 69-70; Tr. 44-45)

The Administrative Law Judgefs finding of four
employees included the Plaintiff.

(R 264-5)

Since Plaintiff

only worked twenty-seven days, he would not have met the
statutory requirements to be counted toward the six "nonfamily" employees required to defeat the exemption.

[3 5-1-

42(2)(b)]
Not only does the evidence support the finding of
four employees, including Plaintiff, it reveals that this was
to be temporary, and that Plaintiff was to replace one of the
others, thereby returning the number of regular employees to
three.

Plaintiff testified of this fact:
MR McIFF: Q Was there any discussion,
that you recall, about the need for a temporary
sheepherder, because of a new herd that had
been purchased, that was lambing different
from another herd, but would later be merged
into that herd?
A

Yes.

Q
And don't you recall that you were
only to be employed for a brief time, while
they had to keep that one herd separated?
A
No. Because me and Lloyd talked
about it, and the guy that was going to herd
that herd was going to quit.
Q

Cameron Conner?

-8A
Yes, And if I could handle the
job, I would have a steady job. He said he
would guarantee me nine months out of the
year.
Q

Okay.

But Cameron Conner would quit, you would
replace him, and then there would just be you
and Mark? [exclusive of Richard Boyack in
the shop]
A

Yes.

Q

Is that the way you understood it?

A
Yes, thatfs basically the way.
(R 60; Tr. 35)
The third source of evidence in the action consisted
of River Ranches1 records discussed in the succeeding argument.
Not only does this evidence "support" the finding of the
Administrative Law Judge, it cannot fairly be construed any
other way.
II.

RIVER RANCHES SUBMITTED BOTH DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE AND
TESTIMONY.

Plaintiff alleges an absence of evidence presented
4/
by River Ranches. —'
Plaintiff totally disregards the fact that extensive
documentary evidence produced by River Ranches was admitted
at Plaintiff's request prior to the testimony of Burke Johnson,
a general partner in River Ranches, and whom Plaintiff called
as a witness.

The following dialogue took place:

4/
—
See, e.g., the following allegation appearing at page two of Plaintiff's
brief, "At the conclusion of Plaintiff's case, River Ranches declined to
present any testimony or documentary evidence to rebut Plaintiff's case.
Tr. 74. Instead, Defendant moved for an order dismissing Plaintiff's
claim. Tr. 74."

-9MR. DABNEY: Before I begin with my
questioning of Mr. Johnson, Your Honor,-Perhaps, Mr. Mclff, would you like to
mark your documents that you have provided to
me informally?
MR. McIFF: Yes. That will be just fine.
Would you like all of them?
MR. DABNEY:
(R 61; Tr. 36]

That's probably a good idea.

Counsel for River Ranches then proceeded to have
marked ten separate documentary exhibits, all of which were
admitted in evidence without objection.

(R 63, 65; Tr. 38,

40)
The ten documents offered by River Ranches and
received in evidence cover the year preceeding Plaintiff1s
injury, as well as several months thereafter, and include
partnership payroll records, partnership income tax returns,
spread sheets showing all disbursements from partnership
funds, partnership copies of all employee withholding statements, a labor record in graph form reflecting times of
employment by every person employed at any time by River
Ranches for whatever period of time, and other documents
Which had been produced by River Ranches as a result of a
discovery request by Plaintiff.
All of the River Ranch documents offered and received
in evidence were made available to Plaintiff pursuant to
discovery before the hearing, and Plaintiff conducted a
thorough examination of Mr. Johnson while the latter was on
the witness stand.

-10At the conclusion of Plaintiff1s case, River Ranches
moved for a dismissal.

Its documentary evidence and the

testimony of one of its general partners was already before
the Court, and it would have been superfluous and wholly
unproductive to have replowed the same ground in some kind of
rebuttal.

It is of no consequence that the evidence defeating

Plaintifffs claim came in during his case in chief.
The lack of merit as well as consistency in Plaintiff's effort to cloud the record with "factual" arguments
and "burden-of-going-forward distinctions" can be seen from
the highly revealing closing argument made by Plaintiff's
counsel to the Administrative Law Judge, to-wit:
MR. DABNEY:

Let me address this.

Your Honor, when we came in today, we had
essentially--perhaps a little background to
assist the Court--we had essentially three
possible arguments that we had for satisfying
the statute.
The first was a distinction between
ranching and farming. And, as a result of Mr.
Johnson's testimony, the possibility of distinguishing an earlier 1922 Supreme Court of Utah
sheepherder case was eliminated, because of
the exceptance of the alternative operation of
farming along with the ranching.
The second possibility that we had was
attempting to discern—there was another Utah
case on this point—to define some of the
family members if you will, the Johnson family
members, as not being immediate family members,
in the sense that they did not live in the
household of the particular identified father
and grandfather. As a result of Mr. Johnson's
testimony, once again it became obvious that
we do not have enough bodies to add up to six,
to meet that particular exception.

-11So what we're down to then—having
struck out on those first two—we're now down
to our third possible argument. [R 75;
Tr. 50]
Plaintiff's third and final argument is the same
made herein, and is the subject of the next section.
III. PARTNERSHIPS ARE NOT EXCLUDED FROM QUALIFYING FOR THE
AGRICULTURAL EXEMPTION.
A.

The statute is controlling:

The statutory

language would appear to be both the starting and ending
point to this inquiry.

In relevant part it provides as

follows, to-wit:
The following shall constitute employers
subject to the provisions of this title . . .
(2) Every person, firm and private corporation
. . . except agricultural employers . . . (b)
who employ five or fewer persons other than
immediate family members for forty hours or
more per week per each employee for thirteen
consecutive weeks during any part of the
preceeding twelve months . . . .
[35-1-42
Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended]
The term "employers" is specifically defined as
including "every person, firm and private corporation."

The

agricultural exemption applies without any redefinition of
the term "employer."

The "employer" as thus defined can have

"immediate family members" as a matter of law.

The limiting

factor on entitlement to claim the exemption is not the
particular "form" of the employer, but rather the nature of
its business and its size.
B#

decision:

The legislative history supports the Commission

Utah Farm Bureau Federation, appearing as amicus

curiae herein, has filed an extremely useful brief tracking
the legislative history of 35-1-42 through the 1975 and 1983

-12legislative sessions•
No useful purpose would be served by duplicating
the Farm Bureau argument.

One exchange in the Utah Senate is

pointed out for emphasis.

Senate President Ferry specifically

asked one of the sponsors, Senator Cary Peterson, whether or
not the exemption applied to partnerships and corporations,
and Senator Peterson replied, "I believe it does."

[Utah

Senate minutes of February 10, 1983, attached as Appendix 2
to brief of amicus curiae Utah Farm Bureau Federation, at
9.]
The legislative debates discussed in the Utah Farm
Bureau brief further indicate a strong variance of opinion
among legislators regarding the desireability or lack thereof
of the agricultural exemption.

Considerable care was employed

in arriving at the final language.
and either accepted or rejected.

Amendments were debated

If the exemption were to

have been limited to sole proprietorships, that is a condition
that would have been easy to adopt with appropriate language.
The fact that the subject was before the legislature
at a recent time, that it was debated in a context of strong
differing views, and that the language employed survived the
debate and amending processes forms a sound basis for a
reviewing court to decline any attempt to add conditions or
limitations not adopted by the legislature.

As was stated in

Bd. of Educ. of Alpine School Dist. v. Olsen, 6 84 P.2d 49
(Utah 1984):

-13Utah's workers1 compensation scheme is a
purely statutory creation. This court cannot
expand the statute to subjects not included in
its provisions. [At 51, citing Brigham City
et al. v. Industrial Commission 66 Utah 390,
392, 243 P. 113, 113-114 (1926).]
It further appears from the legislative history of
the 1983 amendment that the Industrial Commission was consulted
and had input in the legislative process.

See, e.g., House

Minutes of January 18, 1983; Appendix 2, Brief of amicus
curiae Utah Farm Bureau Federation, at 2, and Senate Minutes
of February 10, 1983, Id_. at 5-6.
C.

Judicial deference to an agency construction

may be appropriate:

The Commission, by its ruling herein,

has interpreted the agricultural exemption provision and its
relationship to family partnerships.

That interpretation may

be entitled to some deference in this Court.
In Utah Dept. of Administrative Services v. Public
Service Commission, supra, this Court draws a distinction
between questions of "general law" and questions of "special
law."

As to the former, the Court applies a "correction-of-

error standard" with no deference afforded an agency construction.

The Court includes questions of "special law" in an

area of "intermediate issues" which lie between "general law"
questions on one hand, and on the other basic questions of
fact, where the "greatest" deference is afforded an agency
ruling.

It is suggested that this middle ground, where

judicial deference exists to varying degrees, includes interpretation of statutory law, which an agency is empowered to
administer.

(IcL at 609-610.)

See, also, Wells Fargo Armored

-14Service v. Public Service, 626 P.2d 450 (Utah 1981).

In the

event this Court determines that some deference to Commission
construction would be appropriate, then the standard is
5/
stated thus: —
The degree of deference extended to the decisions
of the Commission on these intermediate types
of issues has been given various expressions,
but al1 are variations of the idea that the
Commissions decisions must fall within the
limits of reasonableness or rationality.
[Id. at 610.]
I t is respectfully submitted that the agency construction is both reasonable and rational, and any other decision
would place form over substance and be defeative of the
family farm sought to be protected when the legislation was
adopted.

I t would result in discrimination without a rational

basis, a point effectively made by amicus curiae Utah Farm
Bureau Federation in i t s brief, citing appropriate authority.
D.

Whether or not a partnership is a separate

entity is not controlling:

Given the language of the statute

in question, i t may be immaterial whether or not a partnership
i s considered a separate employing legal entity.
Plaintiff's

argument thereon could be misleading.

Nevertheless,
The old

Utah case Palle v. Industrial Commission, 79 Utah 47, 7 P.2d
284 (1932) does not necessarily stand for the proposition

—/
The author of this brief has purposely employed caution in relying
on the concept of judicial deference to an agency construction of a
statute i t i s charged with administering. That caution i s premised on
the somewhat elusive nature of the so-called "intermediate issues" and on
this Court's opinion in Bd. of Educ. of Alpine School Dist. v. Olsen,
supra, where the interpretation of the implications of certain statutory
provisions was deemed a matter of "general law" and judicial deference to
agency expertise was considered inapplicable.

-15advanced by Plaintiff,

In that case, the Court held invalid

as against the partnership and individual partners a compensation
award based on a claim against an individual partner without
an indication in the pleadings that demand was against the
partnership or against him as a partner.

In the course of

the opinion and in reviewing specific statutes then in force,
the Court said, "Let it be assumed that under such a statute
the partnership is regarded as a legal entity and as such may
be sued."

(7 P.2d at 288.)

This cannot be said to have

resolved the issue "once and for all" and is not very persuasive
authority for the use to which Plaintiff would put it.
The thrust of Plaintiff's position is that a partnership
"is a thing, an inanimate entity incapable of procreation."
(Plaintiff1s brief at 9.)

As previously argued, the legislature

did not draw the fine lines or impose the additional conditions
which Plaintiff seeks to impose.

There is, however, another

fundamental problem with Plaintiff's position premised as it
is on the assumption that if partners cannot qualify as
"family members," then they must be considered "employees."
The prevailing view is to the contrary.

That is especially

true where, as here, the three persons sought to be treated
as employees, to-wit the grandfather Lloyd and his two sons
Jerold and Burke, were "working partners" involved in the
daily operation and management of the family farming operation.
Plaintiff has cited the Court to Professor Larson's
treatise on Workmen's Compensation Law.
therein:

The following appears

-16With the exception of Oklahoma and Louisiana,
every state that has dealt judicially with the
status of "working partners" or joing venturers
has held that they cannot be employees.
California and Nevada have included by special
statutory enactment working partners who
receive separate wages beyond their share in
the profits, and Michigan has included them,
to the extent premiums are based on their
earnings, without the requirement of separate
wages above profits. Ohio passed a similar
provision, but it was declared unconstitutional.
In Utah and Oregon coverage of partners may be
elected. [Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law,
Vol 1C, § 54.30.]
In the sections which follow the above quoted,
Professor Larson points out that courts have been more willing
to treat the partnership as a separate entity where the
claimant is someone other than a partner.

Such cases avoid

the conceptual obstacle of having the same person at one time
appear as both employer and employee.

The non-partner employee

simply lodges a claim against the partnership.
The conceptual obstacle, however, is at the heart
of what Plaintiff seeks to do in this case.

The only possibility

of reaching the number of "employees" required to overcome
the agricultural exemption is to count as "employees" the
three general partners of River Ranches, who are at the same
time the "employers."

Professor Larson cites numerous examples

of where the conceptual obstacle is less direct, including
cases where partners have successfully pursued compensation
claims through other family members whose status has been
clearly limited to that of an "employee."

Professor Larson

then states, "It is a much heavier task to segregate the
partnership entity to such an extent that the same person can
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Professor Larson's solution to the general problem
under discussion is this:

"Usually this issue would be

settled by the listing of partnerships or unincorporated
bodies in the statutory definition of employers."

(§ 54:31)

In Utah, of course, the section under discussion (35-1-42)
has done just that.

The term "employer" includes enumerated

public entities and "every person, firm and private corporation."
That eliminates all necessity of arguing about what is or is
not a "legal entity."

At the same time, it avoids the problem

of whether or not a partnership has the power of "procreation."
Such is simply a non-issue, since the legislature has not
drawn a distinction between the type of "employer" who can
qualify for the agricultural exemption.

The statute simply

states that "agricultural employers . . . who employ five or
fewer persons other than immediate family members, etc."
qualify for the exemption.

The word "employers," by definition,

includes "persons, firms and private corporations."

The

exemption is lost not by formation of a family partnership,
but rather when the operation goes too far beyond the family
circle, i.e. six non-family employees.
It is not for us to pass upon the wisdom of the
exemption, rather it is this Courtfs primary responsibility
in construing the legislation to give effect to the intent of
the legislature.

American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1

(Utah 1984); Christensen v. Industrial Commission, 642 P.2d
755 (Utah 1982).

That can only be done by taking the statute
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as is" and by applying it without imposition of conditions

or limitations which the legislature did not see fit to
impose.
CONCLUSION
The plain language of the statute governs.
Ranches is an "employer" as the term is defined.

River

As such, it

is eligible for exempt status if it meets the statutory
requirements as to type of business and number of employees.
There is solid evidence duly admitted that its business was
agriculture and that it employed fewer than six persons other
than immediate family members.
This Court should affirm the decision of the Commission
and award River Ranches its costs.
Respectfully submitted this
1985.

/i
1( ^J day of December,
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